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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents the development of a demand
equation for symphony orchestras and a three equation,
simultaneous model examining factors which influence
nonprofit executive compensation.

Results from the demand

equation demonstrate that nonprofit orchestras operate in
the inelastic portion of the demand curve.

Thus, ticket

sales generate negative marginal revenues and attendance is
increased at the expense of profit.

If total revenue is

less than total cost, the orchestra must be subsidized by
contributions from private and public sectors.

The

compensation model indicates that salary is positively
correlated with the ability to increase contributions and
improve organizational quality.

Therefore, administrators

seeking to enhance income and marketability would do well to
focus their energizes on these two critical areas.
Additionally, private contributions and quality respond
positively to executive pay.

Organizations seeking to

enhance their reputation by increasing their level of
service will bid up the salary of superior managers.
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CHAPTER 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES

Traditional microeconomic theory assumes that firms
seek to maximize profits.

In order for a firm to achieve

this enviable position, it must be managed by executives
with the same objective.

Thus, conventional wisdom holds

that the salaries of corporate executives should be tied
directly to their firm's profitability.

In this manner,

executives are provided with a strong, sure motivation to
maximize the firm's profits, since these gains are highly
correlated with their own under a properly structured
compensation scheme.
While tying executive salaries to profitability may
suffice in the corporate world, how are levels of
compensation established in enterprises without a profit
motive?

How does one keep score when the game is neither

won nor lost on the basis of total revenue minus total cost,
return on investment, or earnings per share?

How does one

determine whether or not a nonprofit firm is successful?
Indeed, if profit were no longer a motive, then what new
criteria should be established in order to objectively judge
executive performance and thus set a corresponding level of
compensation?
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First, what organizations are part of the nonprofit
sector?

Not-for-profit enterprises provide services to the

community without seeking a profit.

Copeland and Smith

describe such concerns as "the performing arts, museums,
hospitals, libraries, universities, churches, volunteer
health organizations, research organizations, credit unions,
labor unions, fraternal organizations, professional
societies, farm collectives, and foundations111 to be typical
examples of nonprofit organizations.
Three areas exist in which profit and nonprofit
enterprises differ:
sources of income.

tax status, goods and services, and
Of these three areas, one stands out as

the primary distinguishing feature between profit and
nonprofit businesses:

sources of income.

In contrast to

private and governmental agencies, nonprofits garner a
substantial percentage of their income from external,
voluntary contributions.
This dependence on contributions for income in a
particular nonprofit organization has an effect on the
nonprofit executive's decision-making process.

The greater

the percentage of revenue coming from contributions, the
greater the executive's desire to maximize his benefactor's
utility.

When someone makes a contribution, he surrenders

1Thomas E. Copeland and Keith V. Smith, "An Overview of
Nonprofit Organizations," Journal of Economics and B u s i n e s s . Vol. 30,
No. 2, (Winter 1978), p. 147.

claim to that favor in return for an anticipated increase in
his own utility.

Thus, if the executive desires to maintain

a healthy operation over the long term, he must search for
those projects that will simultaneously appeal to current
benefactors and attract potential contributors.

Indeed, it

is hard to imagine a successful manager of a symphony
orchestra who does not schedule performances with his
contributors in mind.

Therefore, in contrast to the

executive of a profit-seeking corporation who constantly
strives to maximize profits on behalf of his shareholders (a
utility maximizing policy for firm owners), the executive in
a not-for-profit firm seeks to maximize the utility of his
patrons.
The nature of financial management found within
not-for-profit firms is also fundamentally different from
its private sector cousins.

First, we discover that the

methodology used for counting "beans" differs between a
profit-oriented company (assets = liabilities + equity) and
a nonprofit one (assets = liabilities + funds, where the
expression "funds" liberally defines one source of possible
organizational financing). We discover in these two
equations a fundamental difference in ownership.

A private

company has a direct claim to a share of its assets via its
equity position; a nonprofit firm does not.

The nonprofit

firm replaces equity with "funds" to indicate the source of
its life's blood, financing, usually in the form of public

donations, ticket sales, and/or membership fees.

One may

argue that the profit motive found in the private sector is
replaced in nonprofit businesses by the fund-raising motive.
Many nonprofits display an effort on behalf of
management to increase the foundation of subscriber support.
However, this process carries its own set of risks to be
balanced against possible rewards.

What if management

embarks on a policy which results in one group of supporters
withdrawing its support while another group increases its
contributions.

Is this policy efficient?

depends on the goals of the organization.

The answer
Since no shares

are traded in an open market, as is the case with publicly
traded firms, non-traded partnerships, and sole
proprietorships, management lacks a short term feedback
apparatus to gauge the effects of its policy decisions.

As

a result, management could implement policies which are
inefficient and reduce subscriber utility, and ultimately,
contributions.
A nonprofit firm may also operate under certain
fiduciary restrictions.

Whereas private companies may use

their profits at the discretion of management, i.e.
dividends, research and development, upgrading facilities,
additional marketing, expansion into other markets, or even
increased salaries for themselves, nonprofits may be
constrained by stipulations placed upon donations.

Gifts to

nonprofit entities are often made conditionally, with, for

instance, restrictions on how they may be used.

Perhaps the

gift is earmarked for a new building or for the endowment of
a scholarship to assist the underprivileged.

As the

scenario is repeated, the nonprofit finds itself with
various "fund" classifications in its budget, i.e. building
fund, capital fund, purchasing fund, membership fund, and
advertising fund.

Thus, while the nonprofit may appear to

have adequate capital reserves to meet high priority goals
or unexpected disasters, it may not have the freedom to
allocate these reserves effectively.2
In this thesis, the factors which determine executive
compensation in the not-for-profit sector are studied.
Using symphony orchestras as an example of a nonprofit
industry, a model of these factors is developed and tested.
The study proceeds as follows:

Chapter 2 reviews the

literature; Chapter 3 discusses the development of the
model;

Chapter 4 describes the data used;

analyzes the empirical findings;
conclusions.

2Ibid., pp.

147-152.

Chapter 5

and, Chapter 6 offers
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Is the level of pecuniary compensation the only
motivating factor in the life of a nonprofit executive?

If

one believes current headlines, executives in the profit
oriented sector of American business seek to maximize their
own net worth, sometimes even at the expense of the
companies for which they work.

What objective does a

manager in the nonprofit world seek to maximize, if not
personal income?

Perhaps nonprofit firms attract nonprofit

managers, those who are more concerned with providing what
they perceive to be a valuable service to their communities
rather than merely increasing their level of disposable
income.
Anne Preston suggests that nonprofit executives accept
positions at below market wages in exchange for the
opportunity to deliver goods and services with social
externalities.

Thus, the motive to maximize income is

replaced with the desire to maximize one's contribution to
the enrichment of society.
Preston drew three fundamental conclusions from her
empirical research:

(1)

the not-for-profit industrial

sector is primary a low wage sector;

(2)

the difference

in wages, which may be as much as 20%, is not completely
explained by differences in the individual's human capital,
geographical location, or the presence of compensating
differentials found in similar occupations between the two
sectors;

and (3) that a negative nonprofit differential

results from the differences between the level of social
benefits provided by for-profit and nonprofit companies.
Viewing a nonprofit firm as a provider of private and
social benefits, she establishes a total benefit function
for the industry as:

TB (x) = <|>(x) + SB (x) ,

0' (x) > 0, SB' > 0
<])" (x) < 0 , SB" < 0

where
TB (x) = total benefits generated by consumption of
x;
<)> (x) = private benefits;
SB(x) = social benefits.

Social benefits are defined as "social externalities,
benefits enjoyed by parties external to the transaction, or,
more specifically, by society as a whole."3 Nonprofit
orchestras, as an example, thus supply benefits in the form
of personal entertainment to those purchasing tickets, while
simultaneously providing social benefits in the form of
cultural awareness and increased educational opportunities.
3Anne E. Preston, "The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World,"
Journal of Labor Economics. Vol. 7, No. 4, (October 1989), p. 440.

Nonprofits, in contrast to profit-orientated firms, furnish
services which may provide significant social benefits,
otherwise for-profit firms would choose to supply them.
Realizing that nonprofit organizations have the right
to solicit tax deductible donations from companies,
foundations, and individuals, Preston incorporates a
donation function into her model.

These donations reflect

the organization's social benefits as well as its
efficiency:

D = D[SB(x),E], DSB > 0, DE > 0
where
D = aggregate supply of donations and
E = organizational efficiency.

In the labor market, the executive chooses between the
profit and nonprofit firms based on his own utility
function:

U[SB(x) ,w] , Uw > 0, USB > 0
where
U = utility and
w = wages.

Thus, the executive's utility is a positive function with
respect to wages and the level of social benefit created by
his employment.

In this function, executives place a

positive value to increasing social well-being and are
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willing to exchange wages for expanded social benefits, a
labor donation.
In developing her wage model,

Preston states that:

because workers have heterogeneous preferences, each
nonprofit firm faces a pool of potential workers
with varying tastes for social welfare. The minimum
wage necessary to attract the required number of
nonprofit workers will be less than the for-profit
wage if the pool of workers who receive utility from
provision of social benefits is at least as great as
the number of workers demanded by the firm:4
wmin = w' - LD (1D,SB) , LD1d < 0, LDsb > 0
where
w' = competitive wage in the profit sector;
LD = aggregate supply of labor donations;
1D = firm's labor demand.

Inasmuch as the disposition of these "labor donations" rise
simultaneously with increases in social benefits, those
companies which bestow a greater contribution in terms of
social benefits will be able to pay less in wages, ceteris
paribus.
Applying comparative static analysis to the model
discloses two interesting predications concerning behavior
in a nonprofit framework.

(1) The labor donations supplied

by executives eager to work for those firms producing
services which benefit society result in a downward pressure
upon their own wages.

"ibid., p. 442.

(2) The greater the correlation
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between the level of donations and the efficiency of the
organization, the greater the pressure will be for nonprofit
executives to utilize their financial resources effectively.
So, even if an executive wished to use a portion of his
firm's surplus to increase his salary, he could not do so
above the market-clearing level without running the danger
of losing donor support.5
Another segment of the economy which possesses
characteristics similar to the nonprofit industry is the
public sector.

The politician (a public executive) replaces

the motive to maximize profit with the desire to maximize
his probability of winning reelection to either his current
office, or perhaps even to a higher one.

As William H.

Anderson notes:
The role of the elected public official (or the
would-be office holder) in the process of collective
choice corresponds to that of the entrepreneur in
the private sector. We would not be far off base if
we say that the politician seeks to maximize his own
utility by maximizing his "political" profits,"
namely, his voter support and political influence.
Just as the private sector "punishes" an
entrepreneur who fails to satisfy the desires of his
customers ... so the political process "punishes"
competitors for office who fail to gain enough
support either to win or retain office.6

5Ibid., pp.

438-443.

6William H. Anderson, Financing Modern Government:
The
Political Economy of the Public Sector (Boston:
Houghton, 1973), p. 41,
quoted in James E. Annable, Jr., "A Theory of Wage Determination in
Public Employment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Bu s i n e s s . Vol.
14, No. 4, (Winter 1974), p. 46.

James Annable states that the probability of someone
currently holding public office successfully seeking
reelection is a function of his ability to generate loyalty
among his constituency.
primary factors:

This loyalty is determined by two

(1) his support for low levels of taxation

combined with (2) his capacity to generate high levels of
service.

Failure to achieve support from one's constituency

results not in an economic loss, but instead in an increased
level of public dissatisfaction, stemming from increasing
taxes and/or deteriorating services.

As in the nonprofit

sector, the executive's continued employment and his level
of compensation is dependent upon his ability to effectively
manage his resources and satisfy his customers.7
7Annable, pp. 43-46.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPING THE MODEL

The first step in developing an executive compensation
model is examining the market environment of the orchestras.
For all practical purposes, any given symphony orchestra
exerts monopolistic control within its sphere of influence,
i.e., metropolitan area.

Clearly, each orchestra examined

in this study fits the definition of a monopolistic
enterprise:

(1) each major population center has one

primary symphony orchestra;

(2) an absence exists of

current or potential rivals due to the unique qualities of
the organization's services, i.e., live concerts and
recorded productions of classical music;
goods have no close substitutes.

and,

(3) these

If one desires to

experience a concert production, little choice exists except
to attend a local performance.

Each orchestra sells a

unique product, its own individual rendition of the written
music.
Since we are dealing with a monopolistic industry,
supply curves are not well defined and characterization of a
suitable demand function is all important.

Employing a

log-linear demand equation, where exponents are interpreted
as the elasticities of the dependent variable with respect
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to the independent variables, we establish the following:
Qa

= aPblQAb2TNOCb3PCIw

(1.1).

where
Qd

= quantity demanded measured in annual per
capita attendance;
P
= ticket price;
QA
= quality of performance;
TNOC = total number of annual concerts;
PCI = per capita income for metropolitan area.
Consumer purchasing patterns follow the law
demand;

of

the quantity demanded of a product or service will

be inversely related to its price, ceteris paribus.
Accordingly, the demand function employs attendance as a
measure of quantity.

Attendance should be negatively

related to ticket price and be positively related to
performance quality, the number of concerts during a season,
and per capita income.
Also, if orchestra services were supplied by a profit
orientated monopoly, demand would be price elastic.
Imperfectly competitive firms will produce their output in
the elastic portion of their demand curves so that marginal
revenue is greater than zero.

In this case, since marginal

cost is not negative, the profit-maximizing condition of
marginal revenue equals marginal cost exists only when
demand is unitary price elastic or when the auditorium is
filled to

capacity.

Thus, the orchestra's price elasticity

of demand is important.
However, what type of elasticity can be anticipated
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for a nonprofit environment?

An orchestra setting its

ticket price in the inelastic portion of the demand curve
experiences negative marginal revenues.

Normally, this

price structure would severely damage a business enterprise.
However, as a nonprofit concern, the losses resulting from
ticket sales are compensated by way of private donations and
public grants.

An orchestra which sets its ticket prices at

a level lower than the profit maximizing rate expands its
customer base, allowing those who could not otherwise afford
a ticket the chance to attend, and its level of service to
the community.

Therefore, an inelastic price level would

suggest that orchestras do not seek to maximize profits and
would confirm that we are dealing with a genuine nonprofit
industry.

So, the price elasticity of demand is expected to

be negative and between 0 and -l.8
Having examined those factors which influence demand
for an orchestra's services and confirm the nonprofit nature
of its business activities, the determinants of executive
compensation may be examined.

The following relationship is

based on a theoretical model of not-for-profit compensation.
The system of equations is as follows:

Salary
=f(QA, PF)
QA
= f(Salary, PU, TNOC)
PF
- f(Salary, PU, POP, COU,

(1 .2 )

(1.3)
ADV)

“Thomas M. Carroll, Microeconomic Theory:
Concepts and
Applications (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 397-399.

(1.4)

where
Salary
QA
PF
PU
TNOC
POP
COU
ADV

= executive compensation;
= quality;
= level of contributions from private
donations;
= level of contributions from public
funding;
= total number of annual concerts;
= metropolitan area population;
= dummy variable for country (0 = U.S.A.
and 1 = Canada);
= advertising expenses.

Within this model, the endogenous variables are salary,
quality, and private funding while the exogenous variables
are public funding, number of annual concerts, metropolitan
area population, country, and advertising expenses.
Consequently, we observe that the salary and quality
equations are overidentified and the private funding
equation is exactly identified.
In this model the dependent variable, salary, has a
feedback effect on the independent variables, quality and
private funding.

While compensation is influenced by the

executive's ability to increase the quality of his
organization and to generate private support, the
orchestra's level of excellence, i.e. prestige, and the
level of private funding also depend upon his level of
administrative and political expertise.

Clearly, a

simultaneous relationship exists between those factors
(quality and private donations) an executive may enhance to
improve his own financial status and those same factors an
organization seeks to improve by hiring highly skilled
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administrators.
In the quality function, salary and the level of
public funding are expected to have a positive effect on the
orchestra's quality.

A higher salary might indicate a more

competent executive who would naturally be able to improve
the quality of his product.

Greater public support would

generate the additional income necessary to employ higher
caliber musicians.

Increases in the number of concerts

during a season would have a detrimental effect on the
orchestras quality, as fatigue, limited practice time, and
an overly broad repertoire would eventually effect the
musicians' performance.
Executive compensation and advertising expenses will
have a positive influence on private funding.

Again, a more

seasoned executive will exhibit greater interpersonal
communication skills, leading to better public relations and
increased donations.

The orchestra's ability to generate

contributions from the public is also related to the amount
of resources designated for advertising expenses.

In other

words, "It does pay to advertise." On the other side, the
amount of public funding and the area's population have a
negative impact on fundraising efforts.

Public funding

serves as a substitute to private funding.

As the level of

public support increases, private support decreases.

People

have a tendency to contribute less if they believe
government will provide adequate support, i.e. the "free

rider" problem.

Additionally, the greater the population,

the more likely individuals will believe that others will
contribute to maintain an organization which provides
services they may only occasionally wish to consume.
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CHAPTER 4
THE DATA

The data utilized in this study were obtained from the
American Symphony Orchestra League in their publication,
Comparative Statistical Report (1987-88 Season).

This

report contains information about forty metropolitan
orchestras with expenses in excess of $3,500,000.
Table 1.)

(See

These data are placed on a per capita basis.

Unfortunately, among the 214 variables available for
study, one was missing:

executive compensation.

In place

of this missing element, the salaries of administrative
staff were used, since one may assume that a high degree of
correlation exists between executive and staff salaries.
As quality is a central issue in this research, a
variable was necessary to serve as a useful measure
concerning relative differences in the levels of excellence
between symphonies.

Given the presence of a free and

efficient market for musicians and conductors, those with
superior talent would naturally gravitate towards
organizations offering superior wages.

As the level of

talent increased within a given orchestra, so too would the
quality of its product.

Thus, orchestra and regular

conductors salaries were used as the basis of the quality

19

variable.

This variable was then adjusted for the number of

concerts per season.

(See Table 2.)

As revenue data were not available for ticket sales at
each price level, an average ticket price was generated by
dividing total concert income by the total attendance.
Also, a dummy variable was utilized in order to
differentiate between American and Canadian orchestras,
where American symphonies were designated with a "0" and
Canadians with a "1."
The typical orchestra in this study services an North
American community of approximately 2.4 million people with
a per capita income of $10,657.

Its season consists of 167

concerts, drawing in nearly 453,616 attendees.

Advertising

costs during the year amount to $860,545, or about $1.90 for
each ticket sold.
$474,534.

Administrative salaries account for

Salaries paid to the orchestra members average

$23,816 per concert.

In addition to the revenue generated

from concert ticket sales (average ticket price is $11.40),
income is also raised from private contributions
($2,976,337) and public funds ($1,677,168).

(See Table 3.)

TABLE 1

ORCHESTRAS WITH EXPENSES OVER $3,500,000
1987 - 1988
Boston
Cleveland
Pittsburgh
San Francisco
Cincinnati
Toronto
Montreal
National
Baltimore
Houston
Indianapolis
Denver
National Arts Center
Oregon
New Jersey
Utah
Syracuse
Vancouver
Pacific
Phil. Orchestra, Florida

Los Angeles
Chicago
New York
Philadelphia
Minnesota
Saint Louis
Atlanta
Detroit
Dallas
Rochester
Milwaukee
Buffalo
Seattle
San Diego
Columbus
Phoenix
Saint Paul
Honolulu
Alabama
Winnipeg
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TABLE 2
VARIABLES:

Qd
Attend
P
QA

TNOC
PCI
Salary
PF
PU
ADV
POP
COU

NAMES AND DEFINITIONS

Quantity demanded measured in annual per
capita attendance.
Total concert attendance/metropolitan area
population.
Price, computed as total concert income/
attendance.
Quality proxy, computed as (orchestra &
conductor's regular salaries/metropolitan
area population)/ total number of concerts.
Total number of annual concerts.
Per capita income from SMSA.
Administrative salaries/metropolitan area
population.
Total private support/metropolitan area
population.
Total public support/metropolitan area
population.
Total marketing expenses/metropolitan area
population.
Metropolitan area population.
Dummy variable for country: 0 = U.S.A. and
1 = Canada.
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TABLE 3
VARIABLES:

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable
Mean
S.D.
Maximum
474534.6 339358.1 1470717 .0
Admin. Salaries
23816.7
Quality
9274.1
43540.0
Private Funding
2976337.0 1750880.6 6650255.0
Public Funding
1677168.1 2198187.9 10777790.0
167 .4
54.1
Number of Concerts
343 .0
Population
2411637.6 1827871.4 8473400.0
Advertising
860545.0 475054.9 2335523 .0
Country
0.1
0.3
1.0
Attendance
453616.2 256608.9 1095963.0
11.4
3.2
Ticket Price
18.5
Per Capita Income
10657.9
1765.3
13575.0

Minimum
120407.0
5814.0
48000.0
39250.0
54.0
625304.0
193138.0
0.0
182094.0
5.7
6494.0
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CHAPTER 5
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This chapter provides results from the demand equation
and the simultaneous salary model.

The demand equation will

provide an organizational perspective and verify the
nonprofit nature of the symphony orchestras.

The

compensation model will provide a managerial viewpoint and
examine the relationship between salary an executive
performance.
Applying logarithms on both sides of the demand
equation (1.1) yields a linear functional form where the
slope coefficients are interpreted as elasticities:
LogeAttend = - 7.6 - .75981 (logeP) + .90126 (logeQA) +
(-3.20)**
(-5.53)**
(10.06)**
1.2 984 (logeTNOC) + .546 (logePCI)
(2.1)
(7.77)**
(2.33)**
R2 = .87;

F-statistic = 37.9;

N = 28;

where the t-ratios are given in parentheses and conventional
levels of significance are employed, utilizing a one-sided
t-test (1% [**] and 5% [*]) . The sign of the ticket price
coefficient is consistent with our expectations that concert
attendance follows the law of demand, as it is negative,
suggesting an inverse relationship between price and
attendance.

Additionally, it is significantly greater than
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-l,9 thereby supporting the theory that the orchestras
function as nonprofit enterprises.

Furthermore, the

R-squared of .87 and the F-statistic of 37.9 indicate that
this model is useful in predicting orchestra attendance at
any conventional level.
If orchestra attendance were on the elastic portion of
the demand curve, then it could be that orchestras are
maximizing profit.

If so, development of a compensation

model would be unnecessary, as economic literature offers
extensive coverage concerning the relation of executive
salary to the firm's profit.

As this study examines a

nonprofit industry shown to be operating on the inelastic
portion of the demand curve, development of a new model for
executive compensation is essential, since apparently profit
maximization is not the firm's goal.
Turning to executive compensation, the system of
equations from Chapter 3 is transformed into the estimating
forms:
Salary = B0 + Ba(QA) + B2(PF)
QA
= B0 + Bx(Salary) + B2(PU) + B3(TNOC)
PF
= B0 + B3(Salary) + B2(PU) + B3(POP) +
B„(Country) + B5(ADV)

(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4).

As stated above, this system of equations contains a
feedback loop in which not only is the salary variable

9

Since tc = (-.75981 - (-1))/.1373 = 1.75*.
I also computed the midpoint elasticity for a linear equation:
n = -.01256 (11.37/.19352) = -.73.
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effected by quality and private funding, but also that the
quality and private funding variables are effected by
salary.

The two-stage least squares technique, a method

applicable to simultaneous equations which are either
overidentified or exactly identified, is employed to
overcome this problem.
Since the salary equation (2.2) represents the
principle component of the above system, its results will be
reviewed in detail.

As may be seen in Table 4, the fitted

data from the salary equation support the expectation that
an executive's salary increases in proportion with his
ability to increase the quality of his orchestra and raise
capital from private sources.

The constant provides the

base salary for an administrator on a per capita basis (base
salary = coefficient x population).

Thus, an executive's

compensation is positively affected by his city's
population.

Nonprofit organizations in larger metropolitan

areas pay more than those in smaller ones, ceteris paribus.
The quality coefficient indicates that each dollar spent on
orchestra personnel per capita, per concert (($1.00/
population)/number of concerts) results in an increase in
executive salary corresponding to that ratio multiplied by
$8.10.

The coefficient for private funding reveals that

each dollar gained through an administrator’s fundraising
activities results in a 6.7 cent increase in his salary on a
per capita basis.
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TABLE 4

ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS

Dependent Variable

Constant

Salary

Quality

Private Funding

0.023
(.446)

0.015**
(6 .861)

0.924**
(2 .792)

0 .046**
(5.607)

3 .722*
[1.732)

Salary
Quality

8.105**
(3.017)

Private Funding

0.067**
(2.390)

Public Funding

0 .0 0 1 *

(1.881)
Number of Concerts

-0 .268*
(-2.159)

-7.895E-05**
(-6.753)

Population

-9 .558E-08*
(-1.773)

Country

-

1 . 022* *

(-2.603)
Advertising

0.527
(.620)

R2
F-statistic
Number
Note:
**
*

.366

0.751

0.545

9.061

34.776

8.430

40.000

40.000

40.000

t-ratios are given
significant at the
significant at the

in parentheses.
1% level.
5% level.
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Examination of the quality equation (2.3) reveals that
quality is a function of a manager's ability, if one argues
that salary is a gauge of competence.

So that, superior

administrators will seek to continuously improve the quality
of their service, providing benefits not only to themselves
in the form of greater salaries, but also to their audiences
in terms of exceptional performances.
The private funding equation (2.4) discloses a
positive relationship between salary and the level of
charitable contributions.

Thus, a solicitor with

exceptional interpersonal qualities has a significant affect
upon his organization's funding campaigns.

Analysis of the

public funding and population variables unveils the presence
of the "free rider" problem with nonprofit organizations.
As evident from the inverse relationship, public funding
serves as a substitute for private donations.

Therefore,

the more government agencies become patrons of the arts, the
less individuals will contribute to their maintenance.
Perhaps, if one were to realize that his (and everyone
else's) tax dollars were already supporting the arts, he
would be less inclined to part with his after-tax income.
Furthermore, as the population increases, per capita
charitable donations decrease.
too the incentive to free ride:

As a population grows, so
individuals are willing to

let others contribute to the ongoing upkeep of local
nonprofit institutions.
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In conclusion, the evidence supports the theory that
executive compensation is based on the ability to present a
quality product and to raise financial support from the
public.

However, we also find that the orchestra's quality

and fundraising efforts are influenced by the ability of the
administrator it attracts.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

A great deal of research and experimentation has been
conducted by economists concerning the nature of financial
compensation found within the business community.

However,

much of this effort has been focused upon the private,
profit-oriented sector of the economy with comparatively
little emphasis on nonprofit organizations.

Indeed, even

the most casual reader of today's press could not help but
notice the controversy regarding the seemingly outlandish
compensation packages bestowed upon Fortune 500 Chief
Executive Officers.
This study follows a different path, as it examines
those factors which influence the salary levels of nonprofit
administrators.

By assuming a holistic approach towards

model development, this thesis focuses upon both the
quantitative aspects of administrative performance and the
qualitative nature of individual character.

Thus, the

results provide a guide for those managers wishing to
increase their value in the nonprofit marketplace, as well
as for organizations seeking to upgrade their level of
service and prestige.
Data about financial activities and economic
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environments of forty metropolitan symphony orchestras were
collected.

A preliminary demand model was developed to

insure that the sample orchestras did, in fact, behave as
nonprofit enterprises.
Results from the demand equation yield significant
information.

First, concert attendance for symphonies

follows the law of demand:
decreases.

as prices increase attendance

Second, prices are set in the inelastic portion

of the demand curve, resulting in the generation of negative
marginal revenues from ticket sales.

Thus, a nonprofit firm

faces the challenge of collecting enough funds to remain
operational while simultaneously losing money on each sale.
A three equation, simultaneous model was then
developed to examine the quantitative nature of executive
compensation.

The two-stage least squares technique was

applied to correct for simultaneous-equation bias resulting
from the recursive relationship between the dependent
variable salary and independent variables for quality and
private funding.
Results from the fitted data support the theory that
an executive's compensation is in part based upon his
ability to generate donations and to positively influence
the quality of his organization's service.

A superior

administrator generates enough funds through charitable
donations to compensate for the income lost through ticket
sales, allowing his organization to survive on the inelastic
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portion of the demand curve.

Not hampered by the necessity

to realize a profit, the efficient manager allocates excess
revenue towards improving his orchestra's level of quality,
resulting in greater service to the community.

Thus, an

administrator's ability to effectively manage these two
critical areas increases his own wealth and his
attractiveness as a potential employee to other nonprofits.
A nonprofit institution may also utilize this model to
improve its own standing within the community.

As stated in

the demand equation, attendance is a function of quality and
ticket price.

A superior executive will increase an

organization's quality, resulting in increased attendance.
Additionally, a first-rate manager will increase the level
of contributions, allowing for a decrease in ticket prices,
again resulting in increased attendance.

Thus, a nonprofit

organization may enhance its own reputation by hiring an
exceptional administrator.
Anne Preston's wage utility model provides an insight
into the qualitative nature of executive compensation.

As

stated earlier, nonprofit organizations attract nonprofit
managers.

These administrators are willing to trade-off a

portion of their salary in the form of a "labor donation."
This labor donation is positively linked to the satisfaction
they derive from providing a social good.

Therefore in

theory at least, those organizations perceived as providing
a greater social good should be able to attract higher
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quality managers while offering lower salaries ceteris
paribus. However, my results indicate that orchestras
compete for administrative talent:

better orchestras pay

more than mediocre orchestras.
This thesis serves as a beginning for continued
exploration into the nature of nonprofit compensation.
While this model answers some questions, it also raises
others.

Will an executive truly accept a lower salary to

work where he perceives his efforts providing a greater
social good?

Of interest to those hiring, will he accept a

lower salary to work for a more prestigious organization?
Indeed, these issues merit additional study for an
organization must be careful not to equate previous salary
history with managerial competence.

Also, it cannot assume

the ability to hire top-flight executives while offering
substandard wages, believing that the organization's
prestige will compensate.
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